草根
业务
付款
人气
声誉
知识共享
知识管理
服务(商务)
数据库事务
营销
计算机科学
财务
心理学
数据库
社会学
政治
法学
社会心理学
社会科学
政治学
作者
Qingfeng Zeng,Wei Zhuang,Qin Guo,Weiguo Fan
标识
DOI:10.1007/s12525-022-00588-2
摘要
The popularity of online paid knowledge platforms offers opportunities for massive grassroots knowledge suppliers to participate in knowledge sharing services and get financial rewards, but little is known about the determinants influencing users’ payment decisions in the particular knowledge transaction such as paid Q&A. This study examines the factors that influence the performance of grassroots knowledge supplier in paid Q&A platforms. We develop a research model integrating reputation, experience, and authority signal to explain the knowledge payment behavior based on signaling theory. Using a panel data analysis of 12,419 records from Zhihu, the largest online Q&A platform in China, our empirical study reveals that user payment behavior is significantly influenced by reputation signal and experience signal of a knowledge supplier. Interestingly, different from previous conclusions on professional knowledge payment platforms, authority signal of grassroots knowledge supplier has no significant impact on the payment behavior of online Q&A platform users.
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