块链
关税
补贴
产业组织
业务
垄断
吓阻理论
经济
政府(语言学)
商业
微观经济学
国际贸易
市场经济
计算机安全
哲学
核物理学
物理
语言学
计算机科学
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.tre.2022.102695
摘要
In this study, we examine how the use of blockchain technology deters less sustainable products’ entry (LSPE) in the cross-border supply chains in which the entrant produces less sustainable products and enters into the incumbent’s market. We identify that when the blockchain adoption cost exceeds a threshold, the entry can be blocked by mandatory blockchain adoption and the incumbent enjoys the monopoly position; when the blockchain adoption cost falls into an intermediate range, deterrence needs not only the use of blockchain technology but also price distortion by the incumbent; when the blockchain adoption cost is sufficiently low, the incumbent must compete with the entrant because blockchain technology is no longer effective for deterrence. Moreover, we examine how government intervention (tariff or subsidy) affects LSPE and find that both tariff and subsidy schemes can enhance the value of adopting blockchain technology to prevent LSPE. If the blockchain adoption cost is moderate, then levying tariffs on LSPE can achieve an economic and environment-dominating outcome, but the subsidy scheme cannot. Our findings provide managerial insights for cross-border supply chain managers and offer guidance to policy makers who design trade policies.
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