伽利略(卫星导航)
意识
心理学
感觉系统
质量(理念)
认识论
自然(考古学)
哲学
功能(生物学)
认知心理学
认知科学
大地测量学
历史
地理
考古
生物
进化生物学
标识
DOI:10.53765/20512201.28.9.141
摘要
Goff argues that Galileo erred in denying that sensory qualities are present in the physical world and that we should correct his error by supposing that all matter has an intrinsic conscious aspect. This paper argues that we should be open to another theoretical option. Galileo's real error, I argue, was not about the location of sensory qualities, but about their very existence. Like most people, Galileo assumed that sensory qualities are instantiated somewhere. I argue that this is a theoretical assumption which can and should be questioned. If we drop it, we can give a natural account of the function of sensory quality talk and explain how our puzzlement about consciousness arises.
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