期限(时间)
激励
长期护理
业务
护理部
医学
经济
微观经济学
物理
量子力学
作者
Martin B. Hackmann,Reinhard Pohl,Nicolas R. Ziebarth
出处
期刊:American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
[American Economic Association]
日期:2024-07-01
卷期号:16 (3): 178-218
摘要
How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551,000 nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, due to limited cost-sharing, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their nursing home stays instead of transitioning to community-based care. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings. (JEL H51, H75, I11, I13, I18, I38, L84)
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