信用评级
债券信用评级
发行人
信息不对称
可靠性
业务
自然实验
信用增级
代理(哲学)
债券
中国
经济
精算学
作者
Xiaolu Hu,Haozhi Huang,Zheyao Pan,Jing Shi
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.06.003
摘要
Abstract We examine how the issuer-paid incumbent credit rating agencies (CRAs) in China adjust their rating strategies in response to the 2010 entry of an independent credit rating agency, China Bond Rating (CBR) between 2006 and 2015. The business model that CBR employs is a combination of the public utility model and the investor-paid model. We find that the CBR's ratings coverage effectively reduced the information asymmetry in the Chinese corporate bond market. The evidence shows decreased ratings inflation and increased informativeness of rating change announcements by incumbent issuer-paid CRAs after CBR entered the market. The findings suggest that a firm's credibility is an important channel driving issuer-paid incumbent CRAs’ strategic ratings. Our paper provides new information and insight into the debate of whether CRAs with alternative business models can alleviate the information asymmetry problem.
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