双头垄断
原设备制造商
再制造
质量(理念)
产品(数学)
产业组织
业务
微观经济学
背景(考古学)
经济盈余
经济
计算机科学
古诺竞争
福利
制造工程
哲学
古生物学
工程类
操作系统
认识论
生物
市场经济
数学
几何学
作者
Senlin Zhao,Zhuangzhuang You,Qinghua Zhu
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108239
摘要
As an effective mode for product recovery, trade-in programs have been widely implemented in practice. With a trade-in program, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) often faces a dilemma of determining the quality of new products, where quality is defined as an observable characteristic that increases consumers' willingness to pay for a product. On the one hand, for the OEM, a choice of higher quality can increase the perceived value of new products; on the other hand, it can also raise the cost of product recovery. In response, we develop game models considering the duopoly situation where an OEM offers a trade-in program to collect used products and faces competition from a third-party remanufacturer (TPR). Specifically, the proposed models capture how an OEM utilizes product quality to compete with a TPR under the presence and absence of a trade-in program. We derive the OEM's optimal quality choice and investigate the effect of the trade-in program and third-party remanufacturing in the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we examine how firms' profits and consumer surplus change in the trade-in program through a numerical study. Results indicate that the OEM almost always increases product quality in the trade-in context. Therefore, it is profitable for the OEM to implement the trade-in program to exploit repeat consumers and achieve price discrimination. Interestingly, the trade-in program is a profitable strategy against the TPR, but it is not necessarily detrimental to the TPR. Besides, the trade-in program can offset the positive effect of third-party remanufacturing on consumer surplus.
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