Platform service decision and selling mode selection under different power structures

Purpose This paper forms an e-commerce supply chain that include a manufacturer providing products and an online platform providing service. The reselling platform mode and the agent platform mode are considered through an exploration of the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), vertical Nash (VN), platform Stackelberg (PS) power structures. The purpose of this paper is to explore the pricing and platform service decisions under different platform selling modes and channel power structures. Design/methodology/approach Based on the game theory models, this paper investigates the interaction between the manufacturer and the online platform under four different scenarios. The optimal solutions of four models are provided. Through comparison analyses, this paper evaluates the impacts of platform selling mode and channel power structure on the pricing and platform service decisions and the members’ profits. Findings The manufacturer prefers the MS power structure in any platform mode. The online platform prefers the PS (MS) power structure under a low (high) service cost efficiency in the reselling platform mode, while prefers the PS and VN power structures in the agent platform mode. Moreover, the manufacturer prefers the agent (reselling) platform mode under a low (high) service cost efficiency in any power structure. The online platform prefers the reselling platform mode in the MS and PS power structures, while prefers the reselling (agent) platform mode under a low (high) service cost efficiency in the VN power structures. Originality/value The analysis result provides important managerial implications that help the supply chain members develop a better understanding of the selection of the platform selling mode and the effect of the channel power structure in the presence of platform service.