紧急援助
主权违约
经济
货币经济学
债权人
多元化(营销策略)
债务人
违约
债务
事前
金融体系
国际经济学
金融危机
主权债务
主权
财务
业务
宏观经济学
政治
法学
营销
政治学
作者
Marina Azzimonti,Vincenzo Quadrini
标识
DOI:10.1093/restud/rdad025
摘要
Abstract We study how cross-country macroeconomic spillovers caused by sovereign default affect equilibrium bailouts. Because of portfolio diversification, the default of one country causes a macroeconomic contraction in other countries, which motivates a bailout. But why do creditor countries choose to bailout debtor countries instead of their own private sector? We show that this is because an external bailout could be cheaper than a domestic bailout. We also show that although anticipated bailouts lead to higher borrowing, they can be Pareto improving not only ex post (after a country has defaulted) but also ex ante (before the country chooses its debt).
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