符号(数学)
地铁列车时刻表
机制(生物学)
微观经济学
序列(生物学)
经济
业务
营销
数学
数学分析
哲学
管理
认识论
生物
遗传学
作者
Ming Hu,Mengze Shi,Jiahua Wu
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2013-07-20
卷期号:59 (12): 2805-2822
被引量:121
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1740
摘要
This paper studies the design of group-buying mechanisms in a two-period game where cohorts of consumers arrive at a deal and make sign-up decisions sequentially. A firm can adopt either a sequential mechanism where the firm discloses to second-period arrivals the number of sign-ups accumulated in the first period, or a simultaneous mechanism where the firm does not post the number of first-period sign-ups and hence each cohort of consumers faces uncertainty about another cohort's size and valuations when making sign-up decisions. Our analysis shows that, compared with the simultaneous mechanism, the sequential mechanism leads to higher deal success rates and larger expected consumer surpluses. This result holds for a multiperiod extension and when the firm offers a price discount schedule with multiple breakpoints. Finally, when the firm can manage the sequence of arrivals, it should inform the smaller cohort of consumers first. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI