Optimal recycling model selection in a closed-loop supply chain for electric vehicle batteries under carbon cap-trade and reward-penalty policies using the Stackelberg game

斯塔克伯格竞赛 供应链 利润(经济学) 闭环 电池(电) 电动汽车 博弈论 产业组织 计算机科学 业务 微观经济学 环境经济学 经济 功率(物理) 工程类 控制工程 营销 物理 量子力学
作者
Pankaj Narang,Pijus Kanti De,Chee Peng Lim,Mamta Kumari
出处
期刊:Computers & Industrial Engineering [Elsevier]
卷期号:196: 110512-110512 被引量:29
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.cie.2024.110512
摘要

In recent years, a large number of electric vehicle (EV) batteries have retired owing to the significant growth of EVs. Developing an efficient closed-loop recycling system and effective management of retired EV batteries have become crucial. Motivated by this challenge, a closed-loop supply chain for the EV battery is formulated with four mixed-channel recycling models under the carbon cap-trade and reward-penalty mechanism. In the forward supply chain, the retailer purchases EV batteries from the manufacturer and then sells the batteries to the customers. In the reverse supply chain, the collection of retired EV batteries is carried out by either the retailer, third-party recycler, echelon firm, or a combination of these members. These collected EV batteries are classified into echelon utilizable or non-echelon utilizable batteries. The echelon-utilizable batteries are modified into echelon products, while the non-echelon batteries are recycled for extraction of raw materials to manufacture new EV batteries. The findings are derived by using actual market data and Stackelberg game theory. The influence of carbon trading prices, reward penalty intensity, costs associated with the firms, and competition coefficients are studied to provide a detailed and comprehensive analysis. A comparison of optimal profits pertaining to different models is also conducted. The results indicate that (i) different models of recycling EV batteries do not influence the optimal decisions in the forward supply chain; (ii) it is beneficial for the members to participate in the reverse chain; (iii) manufacturer's profit increases when the carbon quota rises and decreases when the price of carbon trading increases; (iv) the involvement of echelon firms in the recycling sector has a positive effect on reducing the recycling load and increasing the profitability of the manufacturer. Managerial insights and concluding remarks are provided to guide manufacturers and recyclers in selecting the most suitable recycling model based on their specific requirements.
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
量子星尘发布了新的文献求助10
刚刚
刚刚
刚刚
笨笨米卡应助龙弟弟采纳,获得10
1秒前
明芬发布了新的文献求助10
1秒前
Jasper应助人123456采纳,获得10
1秒前
1秒前
烟花应助哇晒采纳,获得10
1秒前
1秒前
打打应助阳光的道消采纳,获得10
2秒前
3秒前
fanfan完成签到,获得积分10
4秒前
波妞发布了新的文献求助10
4秒前
量子星尘发布了新的文献求助10
6秒前
fjnm发布了新的文献求助10
6秒前
浮浮世世发布了新的文献求助10
7秒前
7秒前
Wei完成签到,获得积分10
9秒前
9秒前
10秒前
liamddd完成签到 ,获得积分10
12秒前
半农完成签到,获得积分0
12秒前
Sun完成签到,获得积分20
13秒前
13秒前
啊啾发布了新的文献求助60
13秒前
14秒前
Wwww发布了新的文献求助10
14秒前
shadow完成签到,获得积分10
14秒前
14秒前
无语的宛白完成签到 ,获得积分10
15秒前
笑点低的衬衫完成签到,获得积分10
15秒前
人123456发布了新的文献求助10
16秒前
DG发布了新的文献求助10
17秒前
17秒前
研友_VZG7GZ应助52hzzz采纳,获得10
18秒前
量子星尘发布了新的文献求助10
18秒前
lily发布了新的文献求助10
18秒前
孙智远完成签到 ,获得积分10
20秒前
彭凯发布了新的文献求助10
21秒前
超级的绿凝完成签到,获得积分10
22秒前
高分求助中
(应助此贴封号)【重要!!请各用户(尤其是新用户)详细阅读】【科研通的精品贴汇总】 10000
2025-2031全球及中国金刚石触媒粉行业研究及十五五规划分析报告 6000
Real World Research, 5th Edition 680
Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo By Jenine Beekhuyzen, Pat Bazeley · 2024 660
Superabsorbent Polymers 600
Handbook of Migration, International Relations and Security in Asia 555
Between high and low : a chronology of the early Hellenistic period 500
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 材料科学 生物 医学 工程类 计算机科学 有机化学 物理 生物化学 纳米技术 复合材料 内科学 化学工程 人工智能 催化作用 遗传学 数学 基因 量子力学 物理化学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 5675369
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 4945575
关于积分的说明 15152710
捐赠科研通 4834585
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 2589541
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 1543247
关于科研通互助平台的介绍 1501131