Game Analysis of the Driving Modes in the Supply Chain Management Regarding Credit System Construction

This paper analyzes effort levels of supervisors, the manufacturers association and the administrative supervision department, and manufacturer in a supply chain management regarding credit system (CS) construction based on two different driving modes using game theory. A whole CS construction, in a supply chain management system, can be generally divided into two driving modes, industry regulation (IR), and administrative supervision (AS). The authors firstly establish payoff functions based on traditional income function and marginal effort-cost function. And then they analyze strategic equilibriums of the supervisors and the manufacturers based on their decision roles in the two modes. After that, they make comparisons on equilibrium states between IR and AS. From the results, they find that strategic equilibriums in AS construction is not necessarily better than those in IR construction. These results can also provide strategic help for CS construction in supply chain management when considering better combination between IR and AS.