Strategic information sharing and competition under cap-and-trade regulation

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether truthful information sharing can be achieved via informal cheap talk in a competitive setting, and how carbon emission constraint and information-sharing modes (no information sharing, partial information sharing and public information sharing) interact with each other under cap-and-trade regulation. Design/methodology/approach This paper establishes an emission-dependent supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, an incumbent retailer who has superior demand information and a new entrant retailer. The manufacturer abates carbon emissions under the pressures of government environmental regulation and consumers’ eco-friendly concern. The research formulates a multistage game to explore every party’s decision and the implications of information-sharing modes. Findings The results show that truthful information sharing can be achieved when the manufacturer decides both the wholesale price and carbon emission abatement. The results also show that the incumbent retailer’s information-sharing decision highly depends on the manufacturer’s capacity in abating carbon emissions and the demand uncertainty. Originality/value The research adds value to information management and sustainable production literature. This work emphasizes the interaction between the information flow and material flow. Not only it investigates the factors that affect information-sharing modes from a new point of view when considering carbon emission constraint, but also provides operational strategies for manufacturers to make more profit when facing asymmetric information and emission regulation.