工资
高管薪酬
股票期权
限制性股票
不合格股票期权
库存(枪支)
业务
股东
委托代理问题
会计
公司治理
财务
经济
股票市场
市场经济
生物
工程类
机械工程
古生物学
马
作者
Steve Lovett,Abdul Rasheed,Wanrong Hou
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.bushor.2021.02.041
摘要
CEO pay has gone through remarkable changes over the past two decades. The most striking new features have been the increased use of stock options in the early 2000s, and of restricted stock since then. Both forms of stock-based compensation are intended to resolve the agency problem that occurs when CEOs do not act in the best interests of stockholders, but each has its advantages and limitations. In this instalment of Organizational Performance, we discuss the history of their use and similarities and differences between the two, and argue that both are often overused. Bonuses based on strategic goals, on the other hand, may be underused. We conclude with a contextual approach to guide boards of directors in making choices among the forms of CEO compensation—stock options, restricted stock, salary, and bonus—to incentivize CEOs to work toward maximizing organizational performance. Briefly, stock options are most appropriate for growth firms, and restricted stock for stable firms. Both forms of stock-based compensation are more appropriate for new than for long-tenured CEOs.
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