动态定价
微观经济学
质量(理念)
经济
产品(数学)
价值(数学)
业务
灵敏度(控制系统)
骨料(复合)
计量经济学
计算机科学
工程类
哲学
机器学习
复合材料
认识论
材料科学
数学
电子工程
几何学
作者
André Stenzel,Christoph Wolf,Peter Schmidt
标识
DOI:10.1145/3391403.3399522
摘要
Maintaining good ratings increases the profits of sellers on online platforms. We analyze the role of strategic pricing for ratings management in a setting where a monopolist sells a good of unknown quality. Higher prices reduce the value for money, which on average worsens reviews. However, higher prices also induce only those consumers with a strong taste for the product to purchase, which on average improves reviews. We provide conditions under which the latter effect dominates so that ratings management leads to an upward pressure on prices. This upward pressure increases in the sensitivity of the aggregate rating to incoming reviews. As a consequence, recent changes to rating systems may have harmed consumers by increasing long-run price levels.
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