内幕交易
知情人
库存(枪支)
现象
股票价格
跳跃
业务
股票交易
货币经济学
内部消息
金融经济学
经济
财务
股票市场
法学
工程类
历史
生物
政治学
古生物学
考古
系列(地层学)
物理
背景(考古学)
机械工程
量子力学
作者
José María García Marín,Jacques Olivier
标识
DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01401.x
摘要
ABSTRACT This paper documents that at the individual stock level, insiders' sales peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders' purchases peak only the month before a large jump. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric information. A key feature of our theory is that rational uninformed investors may react more strongly to the absence of insider sales than to their presence (the “dog that did not bark” effect). We test our hypothesis against competing stories, such as insiders timing their trades to evade prosecution.
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