生活世界
直接和间接现实主义
认识论
哲学
幻想
佛教
心理学
精神分析
感知
神学
文学类
艺术
标识
DOI:10.53765/20512201.31.5.206
摘要
In recent publications, Jay Garfield and Anil Seth have both written about the you. Whereas Garfield is a Buddhist scholar who advocates a no-self view, Seth is a neuroscientist who defends a radical form of representationalism. But is it really possible to speak meaningfully of a you (and of a we) if one denies the existence of the self, and if one declares the world of experience a neuronal fantasy? In the following, I will criticize both accounts. I will argue that they both, in different ways, are unable to deal with a real other, and, drawing on the work of Husserl, I will argue that a proper understanding of the you doesn't merely require accepting the reality of the self, but also the existence of a shared lifeworld.
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