计算机科学
零知识证明
匿名
数学证明
认证(法律)
方案(数学)
计算机安全
无线自组网
安全性分析
协议(科学)
前向保密
密码学
保密
车载自组网
计算机网络
理论计算机科学
公钥密码术
加密
无线
数学
病理
数学分析
电信
替代医学
医学
几何学
作者
Jamile Khalili Shahrouz,Morteza Analoui
出处
期刊:Ad hoc networks
[Elsevier]
日期:2024-03-01
卷期号:154: 103349-103349
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.adhoc.2023.103349
摘要
Recently, Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) have gained extensive attention in both academia and industry. VANETs play a seminal role in smart transportation by enhancing driving convenience and traffic efficiency through real-time information interaction. Despite this, ensuring secure authentication and privacy preservation remains two challenging issues in VANETs. The existence of security schemes that are vulnerable to privacy and security issues or have substantial computation and communication overheads shows the necessity for further research in this area. Therefore, in this article, we present an anonymous authentication scheme based on Zero-Knowledge Proof. To be more specific, we adopted Simulation Extractable Zero-Knowledge SNARKs (SE zk-SNARKs) to achieve anonymity and conditional privacy. Although zk-SNARK proofs are succinct and fast to verify, the time required for proof generation poses a major obstacle in using zk-SNARKs in a time-sensitive VANET environment. To overcome this drawback, we focus on key components of the proof statement, separating the repetitive calculations, and archiving in the Blockchain, which serves as an immutable data storage. By omitting repetitive calculations, our proposed scheme becomes lightweight enough to run efficiently on VANETs. Security analysis showed that the proposed protocol satisfied security and privacy requirements. Additionally, a computation cost analysis is provided to demonstrate the significant advantage of our proposed scheme. ProVerif is used to verify the strong secrecy of the protocol, and the results show that privacy can be guaranteed in the proposed scheme.
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