遣散费
业务
收益
同种类的
盈余管理
货币经济学
持续时间(音乐)
会计
劳动经济学
经济
热力学
物理
文学类
艺术
作者
Xia Chen,Qiang Cheng,Alvis K. Lo,Xin Wang
出处
期刊:The Accounting Review
[American Accounting Association]
日期:2015-01-01
卷期号:90 (5): 1871-1906
被引量:111
摘要
ABSTRACT How to address managerial short-termism is an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. We examine the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid earnings decreases and are less likely to engage in real earnings management. The effect of CEO contractual protection is both statistically and economically significant. We further find that this effect increases with the duration and monetary strength of CEO contractual protection. The cross-sectional analyses indicate that the effect is stronger for firms in more homogeneous industries and for firms with higher transient institutional ownership, as protection is particularly important for CEOs in these firms, and is stronger when there are weaker alternative monitoring mechanisms. JEL Classifications: G32; M40
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