不符合
公司治理
一致性
杠杆(统计)
全球治理
会计
全球化
股东
政治
业务
经济体制
经济
政治学
市场经济
管理
法学
财务
机器学习
计算机科学
作者
Michael A. Witt,Stav Fainshmidt,Ruth V. Aguilera
标识
DOI:10.1177/00018392211022726
摘要
What drives organizational nonconformity to global corporate governance norms? Despite the prevalence of such norms and attendant conformity pressures, many firms do not adhere to them. We build on a political view of corporate governance to explore how different national institutional contexts and organizational conditions combine to produce over- and underconformity to global board independence norms. Using configurational analyses and data from banks in OECD countries, we identify multiple equifinal combinations of conditions associated with over- and underconformity. We also find that over- and underconformity have different drivers. We conjecture that while overconformity is associated with a shareholder–management coalition in liberal market economies, underconformity results from multiple complex combinations of national and organizational conditions that often include dominant blockholders, strong labor rights, and small organizational size. We leverage these findings to abduct theoretical insights on nonconformity to global corporate governance norms. Doing so sheds light on the role of power in conditioning the adoption of global practices and contributes to research on international corporate governance by informing discourse surrounding the globalization of markets.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI