激励
补贴
公私合营
普通合伙企业
政府(语言学)
私营部门
业务
反对派(政治)
支付意愿
环境经济学
经济
财务
产业组织
公共经济学
营销
微观经济学
经济增长
政治
语言学
哲学
市场经济
法学
政治学
作者
Haibo He,Li-Ning Zheng,Guohua Zhou
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.tust.2021.104249
摘要
Linking users as private partners of utility tunnel public–private partnership (PPP) projects means treating users as internal core stakeholders in the designing, building, and operating phases, which is beneficial for precisely determining user needs, enhancing operational efficiency, and reducing user opposition. However, tunnel PPP projects are quasi-commercial projects, and users are not motivated to become linked. A reasonable incentive mechanism must thus be set up based on a systematic analysis of usersꞌ behaviors and incentive measures. Users of tunnel PPP projects were categorized as high- and low-cost users according to the difference in their traditional direct-buried costs. An evolutionary game model was established incrementally to investigate the incentive factors and their priority affecting the willingness and degree of users to be linked in tunnel PPP projects. The theoretical model was verified with a real Chinese tunnel PPP project, which suggested that the optimized scheme under the incentive mechanism is more efficient than the original solution. The research results indicate that the main factors influencing usersꞌ willingness and degree of being linked are the government subsidy rate, price discount rate, probability of enjoying a price discount, capital proportion, capital appreciation rate, and synergistic operational rate.
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