绿色洗涤
业务
持续性
公司治理
交易成本
环境治理
利益相关方参与
环境资源管理
知识管理
环境经济学
公共关系
经济
生态学
政治学
计算机科学
财务
生物
作者
Zilun Wang,Qigai He,Giorgio Locatelli,Ge Wang,Yang Li
出处
期刊:Journal of the Construction Division and Management
[American Society of Civil Engineers]
日期:2023-11-01
卷期号:149 (11)
标识
DOI:10.1061/jcemd4.coeng-13543
摘要
Environmental collaboration between organizations involved in construction projects enables the efficiency of environmental management to gain environmental sustainability. Yet, in many projects, this collaboration is gamed promoting contractor greenwashing behavior, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of environmental management. What is unclear are the underpinning mechanisms to concurrently increase environmental collaboration and decrease contractor greenwashing behavior in construction projects. We used an integrated theoretical framework based on social exchange theory and transaction cost economics to evaluate the potential linear, curvilinear, and combined influence of interorganizational trust and formal contracts on environmental collaboration and contractor greenwashing behavior. Drawing evidence from questionnaire surveys, we find that two categories of interorganizational trust yield positive impacts on environmental collaboration and different curvilinear impacts on greenwashing behavior. Two categories of formal contracts exert an inverted U-shaped effect on environmental collaboration and heterogeneous effects on greenwashing behavior. We also find that formal contracts negatively moderate the effects of interorganizational trust on environmental collaboration, and interorganizational trust negatively moderates the impact of formal contracts on greenwashing. We provide novel insights into the interorganizational governance mechanisms regarding greenwashing in construction projects relevant for construction managers concerned with the environmental efficiency-effectiveness.
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