Multilateralism and its discontents

The contributions by Gerson and Anderson in the previous issue of EJIL suggest that multilateralism's critics are not merely hard-headed political realists but include both ends of the political spectrum and a wide number of scholars emerging within the international legal academy — including critical legal scholars, feminists, constructivists, liberal theorists, public choice theorists and those within law and economics. International lawyers, who have for too long defined themselves by our opposition to unilateralism, need to define the role and limits of multilateralism as well as of unilateralism. Both multilateral and unilateral processes for law-making and law enforcement may harm mankind and undermine the rule of law. Both Gerson and Anderson are, in radically different ways, warning us against multilateralism that fails to develop an organic relationship between the international and the domestic. Most of the contributors in this and the last issue of the EJIL have ably, even convincingly, denounced unilateralism. Repeatedly, we have put unilateral action, especially that undertaken by the United States, in the dock and convicted such action as an offence to the international legal order. Although we did not manage to define 'unilateralism' coherently or consistently, most of us have long defined ourselves as its opponents and we continue to do so. Allan Gerson and Kenneth Anderson did not follow this script. Discussing the United States' stance on financing the UN, Gerson had the temerity to suggest, albeit indirectly, that international legality - in terms of conformity with the UN Charter — was not the final arbiter of legitimacy. Anderson, discussing the Landmines Convention, attacked another sacred icon, the concept of 'international civil society'. Both seemed inclined to put multilateralism in the dock. The adverse, even emotional, reactions to Gerson's and Anderson's papers 1 tell us much about the internationalist project and about international lawyers' blind spots. Why do Gerson's and Anderson's views, reminiscent of those expounded by realists for decades, make us so defensive?