报童模式
协调博弈
业务
激励
供应链
微观经济学
动作(物理)
经济
产业组织
营销
量子力学
物理
出处
期刊:Handbooks in operations research and management science
日期:2003-01-01
卷期号:: 227-339
被引量:2629
标识
DOI:10.1016/s0927-0507(03)11006-7
摘要
This chapter reviews the supply chain coordination with contracts. Numerous supply chain models are discussed. In each model, the supply chain optimal actions are identified. The chapter extends the newsvendor model by allowing the retailer to choose the retail price in addition to the stocking quantity. Coordination is more complex in this setting because the incentives provided to align one action might cause distortions with the other action. The newsvendor model is also extended by allowing the retailer to exert costly effort to increase demand. Coordination is challenging because the retailer's effort is noncontractible—that is, the firms cannot write contracts based on the effort chosen. The chapter also discusses an infinite horizon stochastic demand model in which the retailer receives replenishments from a supplier after a constant lead time. Coordination requires that the retailer chooses a large basestock level.
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