官僚主义
精英政治
人均
人力资本
国家(计算机科学)
经济
比例(比率)
首都(建筑)
发展经济学
政治学
经济增长
社会学
政治
市场经济
地理
法学
算法
人口学
地图学
考古
计算机科学
人口
作者
Peter Evans,James E. Rauch
标识
DOI:10.1177/000312249906400508
摘要
The role of bureaucratic authority structures in facilitating economic growth has been a sociological concern since Max Weber's classic contributions almost 100 years ago. Using a recent and original data set, we examine the characteristics of core state economic agencies and the growth records of a sample of 35 developing countries for the 1970–1990 period. Our “Weberianness Scale” offers a simple measure of the degree to which these agencies employ meritocratic recruitment and offer predictable, rewarding long-term careers. We find that these “Weberian” characteristics significantly enhance prospects for economic growth, even when we control for initial levels of GDP per capita and human capital. Our results imply that “Weberianness” should be included as a factor in general models of economic growth. They also suggest the need for more attention by policymakers to building better bureaucracies and more research by social scientists on variations in how state bureaucracies are organized.
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