机制(生物学)
激励
博弈论
机构设计
前景理论
微观经济学
数理经济学
经济
物理
量子力学
作者
Yuanyuan Wang,Ruguo Fan,Kang Du,Jie Lin,Dongxue Wang,Yitong Wang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.trd.2022.103508
摘要
The construction of charging infrastructure needs to keep pace with the rapid growth of electric vehicle sales. In contrast to the increased focus and growth of public charging stations, installing private chargers remains a big challenge. We develop an evolutionary game model from the perspective of the vehicle owners and the property companies based on prospect theory to solve this dilemma. The system dynamics is innovatively utilized to investigate the mutations in evolution, and a specific incentive mechanism is further designed. The results show that: (1) installing private chargers is difficult due to the conflict of interest between the vehicle owners and property companies. The solution to this problem is to increase the property companies’ support proportion; (2) dynamic incentives for the property companies can keep the proportion of positive strategies adopted by both parties at a high level. The earlier the intervention, the faster the stability is reached; (3) property management cost and loss of safety hazards are essential factors that must be kept within reasonable limits to prevent them from negatively impacting the incentive effect; (4) amplifying subjects' perceived value of losses and lowering their risk preference can achieve a better incentive effect.
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