激励
衡平法
高管薪酬
波动性(金融)
经济
库存(枪支)
计量经济学
货币经济学
金融经济学
业务
精算学
微观经济学
机械工程
政治学
法学
工程类
作者
Thomas R. Kubick,John R. Robinson,Laura T. Starks
出处
期刊:The Accounting Review
[American Accounting Association]
日期:2024-05-01
卷期号:: 1-24
被引量:3
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2020-0784
摘要
ABSTRACT When determining new equity grants, corporate boards face a tradeoff between the CEO’s incentives generated from the grant’s duration versus those arising from the convexity of the embedded equity risk. We hypothesize and find that boards lengthen the horizon of new compensation grants in the presence of greater pre-existing compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). In addition, consistent with our hypothesis, we find stronger results in the presence of greater left-tail risk. Further, employing two exogenous shocks to left-tail risk, we provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis that grant horizons are related to risk incentives. Our analysis of the interaction of these two incentive mechanisms provides new insights on compensation contracting. JEL Classifications: J33; M52.
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