Information, Risk Aversion, and Healthcare Economics

逆向选择 道德风险 精算学 信息不对称 风险厌恶(心理学) 医疗保健 团体保险 汽车保险风险选择 业务 经济 期望效用假设 意外伤害保险 保险单 微观经济学 激励 一般保险 收入保障保险 金融经济学 经济增长
作者
Hendrik Schmitz,Svenja Winkler
标识
DOI:10.1093/acrefore/9780190625979.013.266
摘要

The terms information and risk aversion play central roles in healthcare economics. While risk aversion is among the main reasons for the existence of health insurance, information asymmetries between insured individual and insurance company potentially lead to moral hazard or adverse selection. This has implications for the optimal design of health insurance contracts, but whether there is indeed moral hazard or adverse selection is ultimately an empirical question. Recently, there was even a debate whether the opposite of adverse selection—advantageous selection—prevails. Private information on risk aversion might weigh out information asymmetries regarding risk type and lead to more insurance coverage of healthy individuals (instead of less insurance coverage in adverse selection). Information and risk preferences are important not only in health insurance but more generally in health economics. For instance, they affect health behavior and, consequently, health outcomes. The degree of risk aversion, the ability to perceive risks, and the availability of information about risks partly explain why some individuals engage in unhealthy behavior while others refrain from smoking, drinking, or the like. Information has several dimensions. Apart from information on one’s personal health status, risk preferences, or health risks, consumer information on provider quality or health insurance supply is central in the economics of healthcare. Even though healthcare systems are necessarily highly regulated throughout the world, all systems at least allow for some market elements. These typically include the possibility of consumer choice, for instance, regarding health insurance coverage or choice of medical provider. An important question is whether consumer choice elements work in the healthcare sector—that is, whether consumers actually make rational or optimal decisions—and whether more information can improve decision quality.
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
更新
大幅提高文件上传限制,最高150M (2024-4-1)

科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
甜甜白莲发布了新的文献求助10
刚刚
1秒前
1秒前
小熊猫完成签到,获得积分10
2秒前
2秒前
隐形曼青应助阔达书雪采纳,获得10
2秒前
2秒前
3秒前
zzd12318发布了新的文献求助10
3秒前
hujialiang完成签到,获得积分10
3秒前
饱满的百招完成签到 ,获得积分10
3秒前
小宋爱科研完成签到 ,获得积分10
5秒前
xhp完成签到,获得积分10
5秒前
6秒前
jin_strive完成签到,获得积分0
6秒前
六个核桃手拉手完成签到,获得积分10
6秒前
科研路上的干饭桶完成签到,获得积分10
7秒前
研友_LjVvaL完成签到,获得积分10
7秒前
xhp发布了新的文献求助10
8秒前
香蕉绿柳完成签到,获得积分10
10秒前
悦耳静枫完成签到,获得积分10
11秒前
昂口3完成签到 ,获得积分10
13秒前
打打应助ludy采纳,获得10
13秒前
幽默的小懒猪完成签到,获得积分20
14秒前
深情安青应助hswhswqkdh采纳,获得30
15秒前
蓝景轩辕完成签到 ,获得积分0
16秒前
17秒前
机智的紫丝完成签到,获得积分10
18秒前
18秒前
科研通AI2S应助小圆圈采纳,获得10
19秒前
阿秧发布了新的文献求助10
21秒前
Zyl完成签到 ,获得积分10
22秒前
23秒前
sbmanishi发布了新的文献求助10
24秒前
婷婷关注了科研通微信公众号
25秒前
loulan完成签到,获得积分10
29秒前
29秒前
30秒前
Owen应助萧水白采纳,获得100
30秒前
Min完成签到,获得积分10
31秒前
高分求助中
Evolution 10000
The Young builders of New china : the visit of the delegation of the WFDY to the Chinese People's Republic 1000
юрские динозавры восточного забайкалья 800
English Wealden Fossils 700
Foreign Policy of the French Second Empire: A Bibliography 500
Chen Hansheng: China’s Last Romantic Revolutionary 500
China's Relations With Japan 1945-83: The Role of Liao Chengzhi 400
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 医学 生物 材料科学 工程类 有机化学 生物化学 物理 内科学 纳米技术 计算机科学 化学工程 复合材料 基因 遗传学 催化作用 物理化学 免疫学 量子力学 细胞生物学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 3147949
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 2798959
关于积分的说明 7832858
捐赠科研通 2456063
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 1307104
科研通“疑难数据库(出版商)”最低求助积分说明 628062
版权声明 601620