夏普里值
加法函数
对称(几何)
数学
空(SQL)
符号(数学)
表征(材料科学)
财产(哲学)
数理经济学
一致性(知识库)
班级(哲学)
纯数学
价值(数学)
组合数学
离散数学
计算机科学
物理
数学分析
博弈论
统计
几何学
人工智能
哲学
数据库
光学
认识论
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.031
摘要
We revisit Kalai and Samet's (1987) first characterization of the class of weighted Shapley values. While keeping efficiency, additivity, and the null player property from the original characterization of the symmetric Shapley value, they replace symmetry with positivity and partnership consistency. The latter two properties, however, are neither implied by nor related to symmetry. We suggest relaxations of symmetry that together with efficiency, additivity, and the null player property characterize classes of weighted Shapley values. For example, weak sign symmetry requires the payoffs of mutually dependent players to have the same sign. Mutually dependent players are symmetric players whose marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them are zero.
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