代理成本
补贴
财务
代理(哲学)
投资(军事)
中国
政府(语言学)
经济
业务
内部融资
货币经济学
公共经济学
信息不对称
市场经济
公司治理
语言学
政治
认识论
股东
哲学
法学
政治学
作者
Zhijun Lin,Shengqiang Liu,Fangcheng Sun
摘要
Abstract This study investigates the association between financing constraints/agency problem (agency costs) and corporate R&D investment in China by using the two‐tier stochastic frontier model initially developed by Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009) in light of the Euler equation analysis framework. The results show that there is a significantly negative association between financing constraints and firms' R&D investments and a significantly positive relationship between agency costs and R&D investments. Thus, financing constraints lead to R&D underinvestment, while agency costs cause R&D overinvestment by the sample firms. However, government subsidies have a positive moderating effect on the relationships. The impact of financing constraints and agency costs on R&D investment varies slightly by firms in different geographical regions, industries, business ownerships, and years.
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