认识论
误传
非理性
认识美德
无理数
透视图(图形)
对抗制
认知共同体
心理学
社会学
美德
社会心理学
理性
哲学
计算机科学
政治
政治学
计算机安全
数学
人工智能
法学
几何学
作者
Andrew Buzzell,Regina Rini
标识
DOI:10.1080/09515089.2022.2138019
摘要
The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an "infodemic" of misinformation and conspiracy theory. This article points to three explanatory factors: the challenge of forming accurate beliefs when overwhelmed with information, an implausibly individualistic conception of epistemic virtue, and an adversarial information environment that suborns epistemic dependence. Normally we cope with the problems of informational excess by relying on other people, including sociotechnical systems that mediate testimony and evidence. But when we attempt to engage in epistemic "superheroics" - withholding trust from others and trying to figure it all out for ourselves – these can malfunction in ways that make us vulnerable to forming irrational beliefs. Some epistemic systems are prone to coalescing audiences around false conspiracy theories. This analysis affords a new perspective on philosophical efforts to understand conspiracy theories and other epistemic projects prone to collective irrationality.
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