Can Evidence Be Permissive?

Chapter Twelve Can Evidence Be Permissive? Thomas Kelly, Thomas KellySearch for more papers by this authorRoger White, Roger WhiteSearch for more papers by this author Thomas Kelly, Thomas KellySearch for more papers by this authorRoger White, Roger WhiteSearch for more papers by this author Book Editor(s):Ernest Sosa, Ernest SosaSearch for more papers by this authorMatthias Steup, Matthias SteupSearch for more papers by this authorJohn Turri, John TurriSearch for more papers by this author First published: 10 September 2013 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781394260744.ch12 AboutPDFPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShareShare a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Summary More importantly, certain views in epistemology that everyone would be inclined to treat as paradigms of “permissive” views seem to be consistent with uniqueness principles that lack interpersonal import. The general trajectory of confirmation theory in the twentieth century is perhaps significant. Carnap's original vision for an “inductive logic” was that of a system that would assign a unique “degree of confirmation” that would attach to any hypothesis given a particular body of evidence. Thus, for many contemporary philosophers the assumptions about evidential support that are needed to resist Roger's argument are independently motivated. Common wisdom has it that examining the evidence and forming rational beliefs on the basis of this evidence is a good means, indeed the best means, to forming true beliefs and avoiding error. References Ballantyne , N. and Coffman , E.J. ( 2011 ) Uniqueness, evidence, and rationality . Philosophers' Imprint 11 ( 18 ). Web of Science®Google Scholar Ballantyne , N. and Coffman , E.J. ( 2012 ) Conciliationism and uniqueness . Australasian Journal of Philosophy : 90 ( 4 ): 657 – 670 . 10.1080/00048402.2011.627926 Web of Science®Google Scholar Christensen , D. ( 2007 ) Epistemology of disagreement: the good news . Philosophical Review 116 ( 2 ): 187 – 217 . 10.1215/00318108-2006-035 Web of Science®Google Scholar Christensen , D. ( 2009 ) Disagreement as evidence: the epistemology of controversy . Philosophy Compass 4 ( 5 ): 756 – 767 . 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x Google Scholar Cohen , S. ( 2013 ) A tentative defense of the equal weight view . In The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays , ed. D. Christensen and J. Lackey . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.003.0006 Google Scholar Elga , A. ( 2010 ) Subjective probabilities should be sharp . Philosophers' Imprint 10 ( 5 ). Web of Science®Google Scholar Feldman , R. ( 2006 ) Epistemological puzzles about disagreement . In Epistemology Futures , ed. S. Hetherington , pp. 216 – 236 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 10.1093/oso/9780199273317.003.0013 Google Scholar R. Feldman and T. Warfield eds. ( 2010 ) Disagreement . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001 Google Scholar James , W. ( 1897 ) The will to believe . In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy . New York : Longmans, Green, and Co . Google Scholar Joyce , J.M. ( 1998 ) A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism . Philosophy of Science 65 ( 4 ): 575 – 603 . 10.1086/392661 Web of Science®Google Scholar Joyce , J.M. ( 2010 ) A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making . Philosophical Perspectives 24 ( 1 ): 281 – 323 . 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00194.x Web of Science®Google Scholar Kelly , T. ( 2003 ) Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: a critique . Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 ( 3 ): 612 – 640 . 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00281.x Web of Science®Google Scholar Kelly , T. ( 2005 ) The epistemic significance of disagreement . In Oxford Studies in Epistemology , Vol. 1 , ed. J. Hawthorne and T. Gendler , pp. 167 – 196 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 10.1093/oso/9780199285891.003.0007 Web of Science®Google Scholar Kelly , T. ( 2010 ) Peer disagreement and higher order evidence . In Disagreement , ed. R. Feldman and T. Warfield , pp. 111 – 174 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007 Google Scholar Lee , M. (manuscript) Sharpening up the Uniqueness thesis . Google Scholar Matheson , J. ( 2011 ) The case for rational Uniqueness . Logic and Episteme 2 ( 3 ): 359 – 373 . 10.5840/logos-episteme20112319 Google Scholar Meacham , C.J.G. (manuscript) Impermissive Bayesianism . Google Scholar Rachiele , J. (unpublished). Google Scholar Sorensen , R.A. ( 1988 ) Blindspots . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar White , R. ( 2005 ) Epistemic permissiveness . Philosophical Perspectives 19 : 445 – 459 . 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00069.x Google Scholar White , R. ( 2009 ) Evidential symmetry and mushy credence . In Oxford Studies in Epistemology , pp. 445 – 459 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Further Reading Conee , E. ( 2010 ) Rational disagreement defended . In Disagreement , ed. R. Feldman and T. Warfield , pp. 69 – 90 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0005 Google Scholar Goldman , A. ( 2010 ) Epistemic relativism and reasonable disagreement . In Disagreement , ed. R. Feldman and T. Warfield , pp. 187 – 215 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0009 Web of Science®Google Scholar References Ballantyne , N. and Coffman , E.J. ( 2011 ) Uniqueness, evidence, and rationality . Philosophers' Imprint 11 ( 18 ). Web of Science®Google Scholar Bruckner , A. and Bundy , A. ( 2012 ) On “epistemic permissiveness .” Synthese 188 : 165 – 177 . 10.1007/s11229-011-9921-9 Web of Science®Google Scholar Christensen , D. ( 2007 ) Epistemology of disagreement: the good news . Philosophical Review 116 : 187 – 217 . 10.1215/00318108-2006-035 Web of Science®Google Scholar Christensen , D. ( 2009 ) Disagreement as evidence: the epistemology of controversy . Philosophy Compass 4 : 756 – 767 . 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x Google Scholar Douven , I. ( 2009 ) Uniqueness revisited . American Philosophical Quarterly 46 : 347 – 361 . Web of Science®Google Scholar Feldman , R. ( 2007 ) Reasonable religious disagreement . In Philosophers without God , ed. L. Antony , pp. 197 – 214 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 10.1093/oso/9780195173079.003.0016 Google Scholar Kripke , S . ( 2011 ) Two paradoxes of knowledge . In Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers , Vol. 1 , pp. 27 – 51 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730155.001.0001 Google Scholar Meacham , C . (manuscript) Impermissive Bayesianism . Google Scholar Moss , S. ( 2013 ) Epistemology formalized . Philosophical Review 122 ( 1 ): 1 – 43 . 10.1215/00318108-1728705 Web of Science®Google Scholar Schoenfield , M. (forthcoming) Permission to believe: why permissivism is true and what it tells us about irrelevant influences on belief . Noûs . Google Scholar Sosa , E. (forthcoming) The epistemology of disagreement . In The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays , ed. J. Lackey and D. Christensen . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Titelbaum , M. ( 2010 ) Not enough there: evidence, reasons, and language independence . Philosophical Perspectives 24 : 477 – 528 . 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00201.x Web of Science®Google Scholar van Fraassen , B. ( 1984 ) Belief and the will . Journal of Philosophy 81 : 235 – 256 . 10.2307/2026388 Web of Science®Google Scholar White , R. ( 2005 ) Epistemic permissiveness . Philosophical Perspectives 19 : 445 – 459 . 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00069.x Google Scholar Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Second Edition ReferencesRelatedInformation