危险废物
业务
供应链
补贴
废物收集
竞赛(生物学)
废物管理
瓶颈
政府(语言学)
废物处理
环境经济学
城市固体废物
运营管理
工程类
营销
经济
哲学
生物
语言学
市场经济
生态学
作者
Mengyao Zhang,Yao Wang,Xinwu Qian,Jun Zhao,Yong Nie,Guangren Qian
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.135714
摘要
The collection of hazardous waste from small and micro enterprises (SMEs) is a bottleneck in hazardous waste risk management. Due to the small amount of hazardous waste generated, SMEs have to pay 5–10 times the treatment price of large-scale enterprises to entrust the disposal center for treatment. This disproportional collection price usually induces some SMEs to illegally dump hazardous waste into landfills and amplify environmental risks. The hazardous waste collection platform (HWCP) is as a third-party service providers (TPSP) launched by the government. It is joined by disposal centers and forms a dual-channel reverse supply chain(DRSC) in the hazardous waste collection of SMEs. In this study, we analyze the competition, the collaboration and pricing strategies between disposal center and HWCP under the DRSC by developing theoretical models and corresponding analytical solutions. The results suggest that the competition between HWCP and the disposal center can effectively reduce environmental risk by sufficiently absorbing potential demand for SMEs hazardous waste collection. Moreover, a stricter regulation from the government is found to be conducive to the more effective collection of hazardous waste for SMEs. Finally, our findings recommend that both subsidy and supervision mechanisms should be introduced by releasing potential demands.
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