同步性
股东
业务
内生性
库存(枪支)
激励
中国
稳健性(进化)
股票市场
公司治理
货币经济学
会计
金融经济学
经济
计量经济学
财务
微观经济学
马
化学
法学
古生物学
哲学
工程类
认识论
基因
生物
机械工程
生物化学
政治学
作者
Xingdong Feng,Na Hu,Anders C. Johansson
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.irfa.2016.02.002
摘要
This study examines how ownership structure affects the information environment of publicly traded firms in China. We hypothesize that concentrated ownership and the associated separation of ultimate control and ownership rights create agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors leading controlling owners to withhold firm-specific information from the market. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the effect of ultimate ownership structure and analyst coverage on stock return synchronicity. We find that a greater separation of control and ownership rights increases the response coefficient of stock return synchronicity to analyst coverage. This result is robust to endogeneity, a series of robustness checks, and an alternative hypothesis based on noise trading. The incentive of controlling owners to limit firm transparency thus leads analysts to disseminate more market-wide information.
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