公司治理
知识管理
背景(考古学)
分类
激励
群众
组织架构
控制(管理)
数据科学
过程管理
管理科学
业务
计算机科学
工程类
政治学
经济
人工智能
微观经济学
法学
古生物学
生物
财务
作者
Liang Chen,Tony W. Tong,Shaoqin Tang,Nianchen Han
标识
DOI:10.1177/01492063211045023
摘要
The burgeoning digital-platforms literature across multiple business disciplines has primarily characterized the platform as a market or network. Although the organizing role of platform owners is well recognized, the literature lacks a coherent approach to understanding organizational governance in the platform context. Drawing on classic organizational governance theories, this paper views digital platforms as a distinct organizational form where the mechanisms of incentive and control routinely take center stage. We systematically review research on digital platforms, categorize specific governance mechanisms related to incentive and control, and map a multitude of idiosyncratic design features studied in prior research onto these mechanisms. We further develop an integrative framework to synthesize the review and to offer novel insights into the interrelations among three building blocks: value, governance, and design. Using this framework as a guide, we discuss specific directions for future research and offer a number of illustrative questions to help advance our knowledge about digital platforms’ governance mechanisms and design features.
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