斯塔克伯格竞赛
贷款
财务
业务
订单(交换)
利润(经济学)
贸易信贷
供应链
帕累托原理
微观经济学
经济
营销
运营管理
作者
Honglin Yang,Zhiyuan Zhen,Qiang Yan,Hong Wan
摘要
Abstract This paper studies a three‐echelon supply chain consisting of a commercial bank, an e‐commerce platform, and a capital‐constrained online retailer. Due to limited creditworthiness, the retailer can only obtain a restricted bank loan, while the remaining needs to resort to the e‐commerce platform to fund its business. We formulate a three‐echelon Stackelberg game in which the bank is a leader, the e‐commerce platform is a subleader, and the retailer is a follower. We analytically derive the optimal interest rates of the bank and the e‐commerce platform and the optimal order quantity of the retailer. Compared with the nonfinancing case, we characterize the regions of the interest rates charged by the bank and the e‐commerce platform under which Pareto improvement can be achieved. We also present the retailer's financing preference under equilibrium and show how the initial capital affects the retailer's financing selection. Numerical examples demonstrate that the retailer's order quantity and expected profit increase with the bank's loan ratio.
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