劣势
首都(建筑)
投资(军事)
公司治理
竞赛(生物学)
职位(财务)
业务
金融资本
财务
经济
市场经济
人力资本
政治学
生态学
考古
政治
生物
法学
历史
出处
期刊:PubMed
日期:1992-08-06
卷期号:70 (5): 65-82
被引量:1109
摘要
The U.S. system of allocating investment capital is failing, putting American companies at a serious disadvantage and threatening the long-term growth of the nation's economy. The problem, says Michael Porter, goes beyond the usual formulation of the issue: accusations of "short-termism" by U.S. managers, ineffective corporate governance by directors, or a high cost of capital. The problem involves the external capital allocation system by which capital is provided to companies, as well as the system by which companies allocate capital internally. America's system is marked by fluid capital and a financial focus. Other countries--notably Japan and Germany--have systems with dedicated capital and a focus on corporate position. In global competition, where investment increasingly determines a company's capacity to upgrade and innovate, the U.S. system does not measure up. These conclusions come out of a two-year research project sponsored by the Harvard Business School and the Council on Competitiveness. Porter recommends five far-reaching reforms to make the U.S. system superior to Japan's and Germany's: 1. Improve the present macroeconomic environment. 2. Expand true ownership throughout the system so that directors, managers, employees, and even customers and suppliers hold positions as owners. 3. Align the goals of capital providers, corporations, directors, managers, employees, customers, suppliers, and society. 4. Improve the information used in decision making. 5. Foster more productive modes of interaction and influence among capital providers, corporations, and business units.
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