上游(联网)
经济盈余
消费者福利
边际成本
业务
产业组织
微观经济学
纵向一体化
福利
竞赛(生物学)
下游(制造业)
经济
营销
电信
计算机科学
市场经济
生物
生态学
作者
Jin‐Hyuk Kim,Liad Wagman,Abraham L. Wickelgren
摘要
Abstract We examine the influence of firms’ ability to employ individualized pricing on the welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. In a two‐to‐one merger, the merger reduces consumer surplus more when firms can price discriminate based on individual preferences compared to when they cannot. However, the opposite holds true in a three‐to‐two merger, in which the reduction in consumer surplus is substantially lower with individualized pricing than with uniform pricing. Further, the merger requires an even smaller marginal cost reduction to justify when an upstream data provider can make exclusive offers for its data to downstream firms. We also show that exclusive contracts for consumer data pose significant antitrust concerns independent of merger considerations. Implications for vertical integration and data mergers are drawn.
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