Generalist CEOs, management risk and internal control weaknesses

Abstract This study examines the relationship between CEOs’ general ability and the quality of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms in the United States from 2004 to 2015, I find that firms with generalist (specialist) CEOs are more (less) likely to report internal control weaknesses under Section 404 of Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (ICW404). The positive relationship between generalist CEOs and ICW404 is weaker when the management risk is lower (longer CEO tenure). These results are robust to alternative models and approaches to address potential endogeneity issues. Additional analyses suggest that this positive relationship is attributed to generalist CEOs’ excessive risk taking. Furthermore, CEO type is related to company‐wide ICW404, ICW404 due to staffing, complexity and general issues, rather than account‐specific ICW404 or ICW404 due to revenue recognition issues. Drawing from the Upper Echelons Theory, this study contributes to the research on ICFR quality by documenting CEO type as an additional determinant of ICW404. It highlights the importance of investors, auditors and regulators considering the CEO's career experience and operating style when assessing a firm's internal control environment. It also adds to the literature on general managerial ability by documenting the cost of hiring generalist CEOs regarding ICFR quality.