CHINA’S SEARCH FOR PARTNERS WITH SHARED WORLDVIEWS: EXPANDING THE “SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION FAMILY”

AbstractThe Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was the first multilateral institution to be initiated by the People's Republic of China and is now the world's largest regional organization. This study investigates how the SCO has enlarged its ‘circle of friends’, which I understand as one of several ways that China attempts to spread its vision of international relations internationally. I focus on two major ways through which the SCO has increased this ‘circle’, namely membership expansion and cooperation with other regional and international organizations. Drawing on official SCO and Chinese government documents as well as first-hand interview data gathered in China in 2018, the study offers insights into the core mechanisms through which the Chinese-led organization has expanded its ‘circle of friends’ and discusses these developments against the backdrop of China’s ambition to influence the international order through the SCO. The analysis will make evident that the SCO has managed to extend far beyond its founding member states and that this supposedly helps China gain support for its normative views and arguments on the international level. AcknowledgementsI would like to thank all interview partners for their time and insights. I am gratetul to everyone who has provided feedback on or discussed the ideas in this article with me at various stages, especially Elena Meyer-Clement, Giulia Sciorati, Nadine Godehardt, Raoul Bunskoek, and Jonna Nyman. I would also like to express my thanks to Asian Affairs Editor Bill Hayton as well as two anonymous reviewers.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Xuequan Mu, ‘Commentary: Successful SCO Summit Draws New Blueprint for Brighter Shared Future’. Xinhua, June 10, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/10/c_137244977.htm (accessed 8 September 2020); ‘Russia, India Enhance China’s Trade within SCO Amid Tariff War’. China.org.cn, June 16, 2019, http://www.china.org.cn/business/2019-06/16/content_74889257.htm (accessed 14 July 2020).2 SCO, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Xianzhang’ (‘SCO Charter’), June 7, 2002, http://chn.sectsco.org/load/43921/ (accessed 27 December 2022).3 See, e.g., Rodion Ebbighausen, ‘Anti-Western Alliance in Asia’. Deutsche Welle, September 9, 2014, https://www.dw.com/en/anti-western-alliance-in-asia/a-17914677 (accessed 27 December 2022); M.K. Bhadrakumar, ‘The New “Nato of the East” Takes Shape: The SCO and China, Russia and US Maneuvers’. The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol. 8. Issue 5 (2007); Sebastian Heilmann et al., ‘China’s Shadow Foreign Policy: Parallel Structures Challenge the Established International Order’. China Monitor 18 (2014).4 Of these institutes, the CIIS is directly administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CASS is affiliated with the State Council, and the CICIR operates under the Ministry of State Security and is overseen by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. For more on the connection between China’s international relations think tanks and its foreign policy making and intelligence analysis, see David Shambaugh, ‘China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process’. The China Quarterly, Issue 171 (2002): 575–596.5 As several interview partners asked to remain anonymous, all interviews are anonymized except SCO Deputy Secretary-General Wang Kaiwen. Interviews were conducted in Chinese and English between February and July 2018 in Beijing and Shanghai. All translations are by the author. The interviewees’ affiliations should be kept in mind when evaluating their opinions and comments on China’s international affairs. Due to time restraints, it was not possible to interview experts in other SCO countries. I thank all interview partners for their time and insights.6 Qualitative content analysis allows the researcher to systematically analyse a large amount of data by creating categories (or codes) inductively and/or deductively (Florian Kohlbacher, ‘The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research’. Forum: Qualitative Social Research Vol. 7. Issue 1 (2006), https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/75/154 (accessed 12 January 2021); Philipp Mayring and Thomas Fenzl, ‘Qualitative Inhaltanalyse’, in Nina Baur and Jörg Blasius (Eds.), Handbuch Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2014, pp. 543–558). Subsequently, the researcher takes into account only the data classified into categories. Given that this study draws on a relatively large amount of primary data (both official documents and interview transcripts), I chose qualitative content analysis as a particularly suitable method.7 Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 1–32). Values are “the moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group” (Buzan, op. cit.). Normative power is understood as the ability to influence international norms and shape what is perceived to be ‘normal’ in international politics (e.g. Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe – a Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 40. Issue 2 (2002): 235–258).8 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’. International Organization Vol. 52. Issue 4 (1998): 902; Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 166.9 Inis L. Claude, ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations’. International Organization Vol. 20. Issue 3 (1966): 367; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. New York: Cornell University Press, 1996; Michael N. Barnett, ‘Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-Keeping’. Review of International Studies Vol. 21. Issue 4 (1995).10 Claude, op. cit., p. 370; Finnemore and Sikkink, op. cit., p. 899; K.W. Abbot and D. Snidal, ‘Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations’. Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol. 42. Issue 1 (1998): 24.11 International organizations are formal intergovernmental bodies comprising three or more states. Regional organizations are international organizations which are confined to a particular region. ‘Regions’ are defined as: “social constructions that make references to territorial location and to geographical or normative contiguity” (Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘Introduction: Framework of the Handbook and Conceptual Clarifications’, in Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 7).12 Annika Björkdahl, From Idea to Norm: Promoting Conflict Prevention. Lund: Lund University Press, 2002, p. 50; Danielle Flonk, ‘Emerging Illiberal Norms: Russia and China as Promoters of Internet Content Control’. International Affairs Vol. 97. Issue 6 (2021): 1925–1944.13 Linda Maduz, ‘Flexibility by Design – The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Future of Eurasian Cooperation’. CSS Study, May 2008, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Maduz-080618-ShanghaiCooperation.pdf (accessed 12 January 2021); Teemu Naarajärvi, ‘China, Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Blessing or Curse for New Regionalism in Central Asia?’ Asia Europe Journal Vol. 10. Issue April 19 (2012): 113–126; Weiqing Song, ‘Feeling Safe, Being Strong: China’s Strategy of Soft Balancing Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’. International Politics Vol. 50. Issue 5 (2013): 664–685.14 Naarajärvi, op. cit.; Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, ‘Friendship with Moderation: The Central Asian Point of View on the SCO’, in Michael Fredholm (Ed.), The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives, and Challenges. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2013, pp. 234–235; Jeffrey Reeves, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: A Tenable Provider of Security in Post-2014 Central Asia?’ Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (2014): 11.15 Accordingly, Ambrosio referred to the Shanghai Spirit as “an outgrowth of China’s ‘New Security Concept’”. Thomas Ambrosio, ‘Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia’. Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 60. Issue 8 (2008): 1327.16 See, e.g., SCO Secretariat, ‘Oumeng chengyuanguo zhu hua shijie fangwen Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi zongbu’ (‘Envoys of EU Member States in China Visit SCO Headquarters’), September 15, 2017, http://chn.sectsco.org/politics/20170915/327900.html (accessed 27 April 2020).17 For instance, since Xi Jinping started promoting his idea of a ‘Community of Common Destiny’ in 2013, he has mentioned the slogan and propagated building regional ‘communities of common destiny’ on multiple mutlilateral platforms, including at the Boao Forum for Asia and the Forum of China and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC Forum) (see, Jinping Xi, ‘“Working Together Toward a Better Future for Asia and the World”: Keynote Speech at the Boao Forum for Asia, Boao, April 7, 2013’. China.org.cn, April 7, 2013. http://www.china.org.cn/business/Boao_Forum_2013/2013-04/10/content_28501562.htm (accessed 12 November 2020); Jinping Xi, ‘“Build a Community of Shared Destiny for Common Progress”: Keynote Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping. President of the People’s Republic of China. At China-Latin American and Carribean Countries Leaders’ Meeting. Brasilia, 17 July 2014’. China Daily, July 18, 2014. http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201407/18/WS5c061bb6498eefb3fe46e0f8/build-a-community-of-shared-destiny-for-common-progress.html (accessed 2 November 2020).18 For instance, the SCO’s call for a ‘new international order’ and for ‘democratizing international relations’ appears to be based on China and Russia’s bilateral agreements and joint ambitions for shaping international relations in their favour. See, e.g., People’s Republic of China/Russian Federation, ‘Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order’. International Legal Materials Vol. 36. Issue 4 (1997): 986–989; Anatoly Antonov and Gang Qin, ‘Russian and Chinese Ambassadors: Respecting People’s Democratic Rights’. The National Interest, November 26, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russian-and-chinese-ambassadors-respecting-people%E2%80%99s-democratic-rights-197165 (accessed 12 August 2022). However, it is also important to note that some cases exist in which Chinese representatives promoted specific norms/slogans which the other member states did not accept. For example, Xi Jinping has called for the establishment of a specific ‘SCO Community of Common Destiny’ since 2018, but this idea so far has not found its way in official documents.19 Laruelle and Peyrouse, op. cit., p. 246; Weiqing Song, China’s Approach to Central Asia: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, p. 103; Huasheng Zhao, ‘China’s View of and Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’. Asian Survey Vol. 53. Issue 3 (2013): 447.20 Alastair I. Johnston, ‘Treating International Institutions as Social Environments’. International Studies Quarterly Vol. 45. Issue 4 (2001): 487–515.21 Article 1 of the SCO Charter describes the organization’s goals and tasks, which include “strengthening mutual trust, friendship and good-neighbourliness”, “jointly combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism in all their manifestations”, and “promoting the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the member states’ international obligations and national legislations” (SCO, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi xianzhang’, op. cit., Art. 1). Article 2 elaborates on the SCO’s principles. These include mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, equality, and the peaceful settlement of disputes (ibid., Art. 2).22 SCO, ‘Shanghai Hezuo jieshou xin chengyuan tiaoli’ (‘Regulations on the Admission of New Members to the SCO’), June 11, 2010, http://chn.sectsco.org/load/270519/ (accessed 27 December 2022).23 Cheng Yang, ‘“The Shanghai Spirit and SCO Mechanisms”: Beyond Geopolitics’, in Michael Fredholm (Ed.), The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives, and Challenges. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2013, pp. 199–225; Bin Yu, ‘“The SCO Ten Years After”: In Search of its Own Identity’, in Fredholm (Ed.), op. cit., pp. 29–61; Interviewee 06, Beijing, 2018.24 Given this study’s research questions, the below discussion focuses on normative and political considerations. Some considerations in Chinese academic literature related to security and economic issues that also implied problems arising from admitting India and Pakistan included, above all, the India-Pakistan hostilities, but also a possible shift of the geographical focus and changing objectives of the organization; India’s boycott of the BRI; diverging perceptions and foci on terrorism and Afghanistan; a possible task overload for the organization, and more. See, e.g., Xiaoding Chen and Yaqi Wang, ‘Dongmeng kuoyuan dui Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi de qishi yu jiejian: jian lun Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi kuoyuan de qianying’ (‘The Lesson of ASEAN Expansion for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Prospects of Expansion of SCO Membership’). Dangdai Yatai. Issue 2 (2013): 100–127; Xiaohong Zeng and Tingkang Li, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi kuoyuan de xueli yu zhengzhi fenxi’ (‘Academic and Political Analysis of SCO Expansion’), Dangdai Yatai Issue 3 (2014): 120–155; Lianlei Bai, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi kuoyuan: jiyu yu tiaozhan’ (‘The Expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: New Development Opportunities and Challenges’). Guoji Wenti Yanjiu Issue 6 (2017): 56–69; Zhihua Xue, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi kuoyuan hou de fazhan zhanglüe ji Zhongguo de zuowei. Jiyu SWAT fangfa de fenxi shijiao’ (‘SCO Post Membership Expansion: A SWOT Analysis of Development Strategy and China’s Role’). Dangdai Yatai Issue 3 (2017): 55–77; Hanxun Gao, ‘Zhongya guojia shi yu xia de Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi kuoyuan: shouyi renzhi yu zhanlüe kaoliang’ (‘Central Asian Countries’ Views on the Enlargement of the SCO: Benefit Recognition and Strategic Considerations’). Eluosi Dong’ou Zhongya Yanjiu Issue 5 (2018): 116–158; Interviewee 14, Shanghai, 2018.25 See, e.g., Zeng and Li, op. cit; Chen and Wang, op. cit.26 Interviewee 14, Shanghai, 2018; see also: Naarajärvi, op. cit., p. 116; Interviewee 06, Beijing, 2018.27 Zeng and Li, op. cit, p. 141.; see also Chen and Wang, op. cit, p. 124.28 Chen and Wang, op. cit; Zeng and Li, op. cit; Interviewee 08, Beijing, 2018; Interviewee 15, Beijing, 2018.29 Interviewee 09, Beijing, 2018; Interviewee 13, Shanghai, 2018.30 See, e.g., SCO, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi chengyuanguo zhengfu shounao (zongli) lishihui di shiwu ci huiyi lianhe gongbao’ (‘Joint Communiqué of the 15th Meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government [Prime Ministers]’), November 3, 2016, http://chn.sectsco.org/load/264512/ (accessed 26 December 2020); SCO, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi chengyuanguo waijiao buzhang lishihui huiyi xinwen gao’ (‘Press Communiqué of the Meeting of the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers’), April 21, 2017, http://chn.sectsco.org/load/264203/ (accessed 26 December 2020); SCO, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi chengyuanguo yuanshou lishi huiyi xinwen gongbao’ (‘Press Communiqué of the Meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State’), June 9, 2017, http://chn.sectsco.org/load/289906/ (accessed 26 December 2020).31 SCO, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi chengyuanguo yuanshou Asitana xuanyan’ (‘Astana Declaration by the SCO Heads of State’), June 9, 2017, http://chn.sectsco.org/load/290014/ (accessed 27 December 2022), Art. 4.32 India’s opposition to the BRI is not as resolute and uniform as many media reports imply, however (see, e.g. South China Morning Post, ‘China fails to win India round to Belt and Road Initiative ahead of Modi’s meeting with Xi’. April 24, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2143152/china-fails-win-india-round-belt-and-road-initiative (accessed 10 December 2020); The Hindu, ‘India Refuses to Endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative’. June 10, 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-refuses-to-endorse-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/article24128902.ece (accessed 10 December 2020)). For more on India’s various approaches to the BRI and discussions within India, see e.g. Jeremy Garlick, ‘If You Can’t Beat ’em, join ’em: Shaping India’s Response to China’s “Belt and Road” Gambit’. China Report Vol. 53. Issue 2 (2017): 143–157; Suresh Nanwani, ‘Belt and Road Initiative: Responses from Japan and India – Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Collaborations’. Global Policy Vol. 10. Issue 2 (2019): 284–289; Mala Sharma, ‘India’s Approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative – Opportunities and Concerns’. The Chinese Journal of Global Governance Vol. 5. Issue 2 (2019): 136–152.33 Interviewee 14, Shanghai, 2018; Interviewee 15, Beijing, 2018.34 SCO, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi chengyuanguo yuanshou lishihui Qingdao xuanyan’ (‘Qingdao Declaration of the SCO Council of Heads of State’), June 10, 2018, http://chn.sectsco.org/load/443127/ (accessed 26 December 2020), Art. 4.35 Interviewee 15, Beijing, 2018.36 Interviewee 1, Shanghai, 2018; Interviewee 14, Shanghai, 2018; Interviewee 15, Beijing, 2018. See also Zeng and Li, op. cit; Jinfeng Li, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi kuoyuan: tiaozhan yu jiyu’ (‘Enlargement of the SCO: Challenges and Opportunities’). Eluosi Dong’ou Zhongya Yanjiu. Vol. 2. Issue 6 (2015): 36–44.37 Bai, op. cit.; Gao, op. cit; Interviewee 3, Shanghai, 2018.38 Interviewee 6, Beijing, 2018.39 Maha Siddiqui, ‘S Jaishankar Calls Pak’s Bilawal Bhutto “Spokesperson For Terror Industry”’. NDTV, May 6, 2023, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/s-jaishankar-calls-pakistans-bilawal-bhutto-spokesperson-for-terrorism-industry-4008992 (accessed 10 May 2023).40 Catherine Putz, ‘India-Pakistan Tensions Flare Up Within SCO’. The Diplomat, March 29, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/india-pakistan-tensions-flare-up-within-sco/ (accessed 10 May 2023).41 Interviewee 15, Beijing, 2018; Interview Wang Kaiwen, Beijing, 22 June 2018.42 See, e.g., Xinping Zhang and Jiawei Dai, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi mingyun gongtongti: neihan, tiaozhan yu guojian lujing’ (‘An SCO Community with a Shared Future: Connotation, Challenges and Construction Approach’). Heping yu Fazhan Issue 5 (2019): 22–36; Hao Deng, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Global Governance in the New Era’. China International Studies (July/August 2020): 149–173; Interviewee 14, Shanghai, 2018; Interviewee 15, Beijing, 2018.43 Interview Wang Kaiwen, Beijing, 22 June 2018.44 Zeng and Li, op. cit.; Li, op. cit.; Bai, op. cit.; Xue, op. cit.; Gao, op. cit.45 Chen and Wang, op. cit.; Xue, op. cit.; Interviewee 01, Shanghai, 2018; Interviewee 03, Shanghai, 2018; Interviewee 14, Shanghai, 2018; Interviewee 15, Beijing, 2018.46 Li, op. cit.47 See, e.g., Li, op. cit.; Zeng and Li, op. cit; Gao, op. cit. This section focuses on political and normative considerations. Economic and security benefits of SCO expansion frequently mentioned in Chinese academic articles included: the consideration that the SCO countries would gain access to the Indian Ocean (see, e.g. Chen and Wang, op. cit.; Zeng and Li, op. cit.; Xue, op. cit.), the opportunity to get more funding for economic and infrastructure projects for SCO members (see, e.g. Zeng and Li, op. cit.; Xue, op. cit.), energy cooperation (see, e.g. Zeng and Li, op. cit.; Bai, op. cit.; Xue, op. cit.; Gao, op. cit.), and improvement of SCO cooperation on Afghanistan and the ‘three evils’ (see, e.g. Chen and Wang, op. cit.; Li, op. cit.; Bai, op. cit.; Xue, op. cit.; Gao, op. cit.).48 See, e.g., Li, op. cit.; Zeng and Li, op. cit.; Gao, op. cit.49 See, e.g., Abhishek Bhaya, ‘Russia, India Enhance China’s Trade Within SCO Amid Tariff War’. CGTN, June 15, 2019. https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-06-15/Russia-India-enhance-China-s-trade-within-SCO-amid-tariff-war-HxJMxlgSRy/index.html (accessed December 15, 2020); SCO Secretariat, ‘La Alimofu: Shanghe Zuzhi xianzai de yicheng shizhi shang shi zhengge diqu de fazhan yicheng’ (‘Alimov: SCO’s Current Agenda is Essentially Development Agenda for the Entire Region’), December 19, 2017, http://chn.sectsco.org/news/20171219/367771.html (accessed April 30, 2020); SCO Secretariat, ‘SCO Secretary-General Calls for Closer Cooperation on Digital Economy’, November 27, 2020, http://eng.sectsco.org/news/20201127/695613.html (accessed 15 December 2020).50 According to Finnemore and Sikkink, when trying to promote a new norm (or one’s normative views), some states’ endorsements are more important than others’ (see, Finnemore and Sikkink, op. cit., p. 901). While “[w]hat constitutes a ‘critical state’ will vary from issue to issue”, in terms of increasing an institution’s (and its norms’ and principles’) international legitimacy, the official approval of materially powerful regional great powers and nuclear states can be judged as ‘critical’.51 In this study ‘the West’ refers to what during the Cold War was known as the ‘First World’, i.e. the US, Western Europe and their allies. It should be noted that this classification is highly problematic, see e.g. Carl E. Pletsch, ‘The Three Worlds, or the Division of Social Scientific Labor, Circa 1950–1975’. Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 23. Issue 4 (1981): 565–590.52 Li, op. cit., p. 42; see also Jing-Dong Yuan, ‘Beijing’s Institutional-Balancing Strategies: Rationales, Implementation and Efficacy’. Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 72. Issue 2 (2018): 116.53 Interviewee 06, Beijing, 2018. For India’s interest in the SCO, see e.g. Frank O’Donnell and Mihaela Papa, ‘India’s Multi-Alignment Management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) Triangle’. International Affairs Vol. 97. Issue 3 (2021): 801–822.54 Interviewee 06, Beijing, 2018; also: Interviewee 08, Beijing, 2018.55 Interviewee 08, Beijing, 2018.56 In fact, since SCO expansion China and India have experienced major border standoffs and clashes in their disputed territories, such as the Doklam standoff, which began a week after the official admission of India into the SCO, and the border clashes in the Galwan Valley in summer 2020, which constituted the first deadly clashes between the two countries in at least 45 years. The SCO has not openly commented on the dispute.57 Interviewee 03, Shanghai, 2018; Interviewee 11, Beijing 2018.58 Interviewee 11, Beijing 2018.59 Zhang and Dai, op. cit.; Interview Wang Kaiwen, Beijing, 22 June 2018.60 It is important to note that such an ‘absorption’ was not imminent in any way, see e.g., the close relations between India and Russia even after President Putin invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Furthermore, it may be possible that India actually attempts to ‘sabotage’ the Chinese-led organization from within.61 Besides full membership, the SCO offers countries to become involved in the organization as observer states or dialogue partners. Observer states have the right to “attend public meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization and leaders of various departments”, and participate in discussions (SCO, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi guanchayuan tiaoli’ (‘Regulations on Observers of the SCO’), June 17, 2004, http://chn.sectsco.org/load/44496/ (accessed 27 December 2022), Art.7). Dialogue partners have fewer rights than observer states and are more loosely affiliated with the organization. As of 2022, Mongolia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Belarus were affiliated as observer states, while Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia were dialogue partners. Furthermore, at the Samarkand summit 2022, the SCO reached an agreement on admitting Bahrain, the Maldives, the UAE, Kuwait, and Myanmar as new dialogue partners, expected to be finalised in 2023.62 SCO Secretariat, ‘General Information’, n.d., http://eng.sectsco.org/cooperation/ (accessed 8 May 2023).63 SCO Secretariat, ‘La Alimofu: Shanghe Zuzhi xianzai de yicheng shizhi shang shi zhengge diqu de fazhan yicheng’, op. cit.64 President of Russia, ‘Speech by Dmitry Medvedev at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation council of heads of state in expanded format’, June 15, 2011, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/11578 (accessed 7 May 2020). See also the statement in the SCO ‘Development Strategy 2025’: “In the coming period, the efforts to expand the SCO’s international relations will be accentuated in order to further enhance the Organization’s role in shaping the new global and regional architecture and strengthening its authority in the world” (SCO, ‘Development Strategy of the SCO Until 2025’, op. cit., p.11).65 Such overlaps are discussed in regionalism literature as the ‘spaghetti bowl’ phenomenon (e.g., Inkyo Cheong, ‘Beyond the Spaghetti Bowl: The TPP and the Quest for East Asian Regionalism’. Global Asia Vol. 8. Issue 1 (2013); Richard Baldwin, ‘Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade’. The World Economy Vol. 29. Issue 11 (2006): 1451–1518).66 See e.g. SCO Secretariat, ‘Ouya Jingji Gongtongti, Jiti Anquan Tiaoyue Zuzhi, Dulianti he Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi gaoji xingzheng gaoyuan huiyi xinwengao’ (‘Press Release of the Meeting of Senior Officials of the Eurasian Economic Community, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’), October 19, 2012, http://chn.sectsco.org/news/20121019/18541.html (accessed 29 April 2020); SCO Secretariat, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi mishizhang Meijincaifu chuxi di wu ci Ouya Jingji Gongtongti, Ji’an Tiaoyue Zuzhi, Dulianti he Shanghe Zuzhi gaoguan hui’ (‘SCO Secretary-General Mezentsev Attends 5th Senior Officials Meeting of the Eurasian Economic Community, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Commonwealth of Independent States, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization’), November 7, 2014, http://chn.sectsco.org/news/20141107/24436.html (accessed 29 April 2020); SCO Secretariat, ‘Mingsike huijian’ (‘Meeting in Minsk’) September 12, 2016, http://chn.sectsco.org/news/20160912/129643.html (accessed 29 April 2020); SCO Secretariat, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi mishuzhang zai Qingdao yu Dulianti he Jiti Anquan Tiaoyue Zuzhi zuigao lingdao ren juxing huiwu’ (‘SCO Secretary-General Meets with the Top Leaders of the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Qingdao’), June 9, 2018, http://chn.sectsco.org/news/20180609/444644.html (accessed 29 April 2020).67 For instance, at the ‘Russia-ASEAN Commemorative Summit’ to mark the 20th Anniversary of the ASEAN-Russian Dialogue Partnership in May 2016, the SCO Secretary-General spoke of the Eurasian and Asia-Pacific region in the singular, maintaining that it was “a (yi ge) rapidly developing global macro-area with huge resources and huge potential. In the near future, it will become the locomotive of the world economy” (SCO Secretariat, ‘Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi mishuzhang chuxi Eluosi-Dongmeng jinian fenghui huodong’ (‘SCO Secretary-General Attends Russia-ASEAN Commemorative Summit’), May 20, 2016, http://chn.sectsco.org/news/20160520/91849.html (accessed 28 April 2020). Moreover, at a working meeting with the ASEAN Secretary-General in June 2018, the two secretaries-general reportedly contended that: “the region is the largest region in the world and closely links together countries with similar traditions, common value systems and aspirations for mutually beneficial and common development” (SCO Secretariat, ‘'Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi yu Dongmeng jixu duihua: liang zuzhi mishuzhang zai Shanghai Hezuo zuzhi Beijing zongbu juxing gongzuo huiyi’ (‘SCO and ASEAN Continue Dialogue: Secretary-Generals of the Two Organizations Hold Working Meeting at SCO Headquarters in Beijing’), June 11, 2018 http://chn.sectsco.org/news/20180611/444719.html (accessed 28 April 2020).68 A tentative investigation of the norms of the SCO’s partner regional organizations, as stipulated in their respective constitutive documents, evinces that their norms and values already preponderantly correspond with those of the SCO. ASEAN’s core principles are: (1) “Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations”; (2) “The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coersion [sic]”; (3) “Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another”; (4) “Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means”; (5) “Renunciation of the threat or use of force”, and (6) “Effective cooperation among themselves” (ASEAN, ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, 24 February 1976’. February 24, 1976, https://asean.org/treaty-amity-cooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976/ (accessed 15 August 2020), Art. 2). The CICA is officially guided by: sovereign equality and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force; territorial integrity of the member states; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in internal affairs of member states; disarmament and arms control; economic, social and cultural cooperation; human rights and fundamental freedoms (CICA, ‘Declaration on the Principles Guiding Relations between the CICA Member States’. 14 September 14, 1999, http://www.s-cica.org/pdf/DECLARATION_ON_THE_PRINCIPLES_GUIDING_RELATIONS_(1999)_-_eng.doc (accessed 9 January 2020)). Article 1 of the CIS Charter stipulates that: “The Commonwealth shall be based on sovereign equality of its members. The