付款
规范(哲学)
猜想
微观经济学
计算机科学
经济
业务
心理学
数理经济学
数学
政治学
纯数学
财务
法学
作者
Christoph Feldhaus,Tassilo Sobotta,Peter Werner
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2018-04-06
卷期号:65 (4): 1855-1866
被引量:25
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2937
摘要
We investigate behavioral reactions toward exogenous changes of implicit norm-relevant information in a natural field setting where customers are free to choose if and how much to pay for a service. Customers’ voluntary payments are significantly affected by subtle information cues: cues that signal a high rather than a low payment norm increase payments by some 27%. Consistent with the conjecture that this effect is in large part driven by customers’ uncertainty about the actual norm, responses are mitigated when explicit norm-relevant information is provided. Additional treatments suggest that the reactions to the cues are not driven by mere saliency but by the information deduced from the cues in the presence of uncertainty. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2937 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
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