经济
政治
激励
债务
膨胀(宇宙学)
独立性(概率论)
货币政策
财政政策
经济政策
宏观经济学
货币经济学
财务
市场经济
政治学
物理
法学
统计
数学
理论物理学
作者
Vittorio Grilli,Donato Masciandaro,Guido Tabellini
出处
期刊:Economic Policy
[Oxford University Press]
日期:1991-10-01
卷期号:6 (13): 341-341
被引量:1277
摘要
Institutions and policies Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini Why do countries as similar as the industrialized OECD countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation? The answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances, nor from the principles of optimal taxation, but rather from politics. This article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers. The electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts. What seems to matter most, it is found, is the effect of the durability of governments. Governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices. Such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties. Central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance, irrespective of the political institutions. In fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline. These findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation, but also for the construction of the European Economic and Monetary Union.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI