价值(数学)                        
                
                                
                        
                            控制(管理)                        
                
                                
                        
                            业务                        
                
                                
                        
                            会计                        
                
                                
                        
                            产业组织                        
                
                                
                        
                            运营管理                        
                
                                
                        
                            心理学                        
                
                                
                        
                            营销                        
                
                                
                        
                            管理                        
                
                                
                        
                            经济                        
                
                                
                        
                            统计                        
                
                                
                        
                            数学                        
                
                        
                    
            作者
            
                Christine Scheef,Thomas Zellweger            
         
                    
        
    
            
            标识
            
                                    DOI:10.1177/01492063251328256
                                    
                                
                                 
         
        
                
            摘要
            
            This study examines the performance consequences of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) successions, focusing on the types of board chairs and firm ownership structures. While CEO successions can bring adaptation benefits and performance gains through strategic realignment, they can also cause disruption costs and performance losses by disturbing stakeholder relationships. We examine how the presence of a predecessor CEO or an independent individual as board chair affects postsuccession performance differently depending on the level of family control. Our analysis of a panel dataset of S&P 1500 firms from 2003 to 2022 and a series of robustness tests provide strong support for our predictions. We found that with increasing family control, predecessor CEOs as board chairs have a more positive effect on postsuccession performance, while the opposite holds true for independent board chairs. Further, within family-controlled firms, the effect of predecessor retention is stronger for outside than inside CEO successions. Our findings expand CEO succession and board chair research by demonstrating that the value of a board chair type after a CEO succession depends on a firm’s ownership structure, particularly the degree of family control.
         
            
 
                 
                
                    
                    科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI