执行
业务
理性
第三方
环境管理体系
透明度(行为)
保护主义
股东
福利
环境治理
环境咨询
会计
经济
公司治理
财务
市场经济
生态学
国际贸易
政治学
生物
灌溉
互联网隐私
计算机科学
法学
作者
Wenbing Jiang,Xuejun Wang,Lei Du
摘要
Abstract Third‐party environmental evaluation by environmental organizations can provide an independent professional evaluation of firms' environmental behaviors. Because environmental organizations aim to improve environmental welfare, which reflects value rationality than instrumental rationality. We argue that third‐party environmental evaluation can reduce information asymmetries between central and local governments, and induce local governments to strengthen environmental enforcement, which in turn increases the pressure on polluters. At the same time, third‐party evaluation improves transparency and exposes firms' environmental opportunistic behavior, which increases the pressure on firms to take more responsibility for environmental protection. In an analysis of a large sample of Chinese listed firms over the period 2009–2018, we find that third‐party evaluation from environmental organizations has a positive impact on firms' environmental responsibility. This positive effect is stronger for firms located in regions with weak local protectionism and weaker for firms with less external shareholder monitoring.
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