可分性规则
诱惑
微观经济学
经济
质量(理念)
竞赛(生物学)
相互依存
随机博弈
零(语言学)
数理经济学
数学
法学
认识论
哲学
离散数学
生物
社会心理学
语言学
生态学
政治学
心理学
作者
Dino Gerardi,Lucas Maestri
摘要
We study bargaining with divisibility and interdependent values. A buyer and a seller trade a divisible good. The seller is privately informed about its quality, which can be high or low. Gains from trade are positive and decreasing in quantity. The buyer makes offers over time. Divisibility introduces a new channel of competition between the buyer’s present and future selves. The buyer’s temptation to split the purchases of the high-quality good is detrimental to him. As bargaining frictions vanish and the good becomes arbitrarily divisible, the high-quality good is traded smoothly over time and the buyer’s payoff shrinks to zero. (JEL C78, D82, L15)
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