The lion and the lamb: ecological implications of Martha Nussbaum's animal ethics

Abstract Martha Nussbaum's translation of her list of human capabilities into one for animals is based on controversial assumptions and results in controversial prescriptions. Here one of Nussbaum's arguments – that, other things being equal, the promotion of animal capabilities implies a duty to prevent harm to animals – is taken to its logical extremes. The consequences of such a duty are immense, yet perfectly consistent with Nussbaum's conviction that 'the natural' must be replaced by 'the just'. Surprisingly, this duty to politicise nature is based on individualistic premises that are not specifically Nussbaumian but are instead widely shared. From the point of view of classical political ecologists, the implication is that caring for animals on individualist grounds may well be bad for nature. Keywords: animal welfareanimal rightscapabilitiescapabilities approachecologismenvironmentalismMartha Nussbaum Acknowledgements The first draft was presented at the Workshops in Political Theory, Manchester Metropolitan University, 10 September 2008, and at a staff seminar, SPIRE, Keele University, 15 September 2008. The author is grateful to all those present, and to the anonymous reviewers, for their most helpful comments and suggestions for improvement. Notes 1. Ecologism, or more precisely 'political ecologism', demands a radically different appreciation of nature (in which terms like harmony and intrinsic value are frequently used) and, as a consequence, a radically different social and political order. Ecologism is to be distinguished from environmentalism, which understands nature as environment, i.e. as resources, to be managed differently, but within the existing order, and more prudently than they are today (cf. Dobson 2007, pp. 2–3). 2. Theses I–II and V are summaries of Nussbaum's ideas. 3. See note 2: four of the first five theses are technically summaries of, rather than implications drawn from, Nussbaum's work. 4. This would read 'Given' if it were unambiguously clear that Nussbaum categorically excludes the possibility that animals other than humans have anything remotely similar to a sense of morality. I am not aware of evidence supporting that particular reading of Nussbaum. 5. Which is not to say that Nussbaum would reject piecemeal social engineering; breadth of perspective and prudence in the choice of methods are not mutually exclusive. 6. Note the apparent inconsistency (though not incompatibility): on the capabilities approach, the extinction of a species is in itself irrelevant; only individuals matter. 7. What I am about to offer is an interpretation of the practical consequences of Nussbaum's ideas that is consistent with the theses defended above; it is not necessarily the only possible interpretation. It would be only if the means and methods suggested here to implement her views were the only ones possible and available, and only if biological circumstances necessitated their application. 8. Genetic modification of a species may well be compatible with an Aristotelian perspective on the good life as aimed at flourishing-in-context. Genetic modification improves or deletes the qualities that keep an animal from fully experiencing the benefits of its capabilities. Even the extermination of a species might be compatible with flourishing, if it means deleting a species incapable of (the animal equivalent of) a 'meaningful' life, as a necessary condition for the flourishing of the rest. 9. Nussbaum implicitly confirms this: 'I am sure that for the deer the hunter's gun is better than the wolves' jaws, more sudden and less excruciating' (Nussbaum and Faralli 2007, p. 158). Other things being equal, under the right circumstances Thesis VIII might even, paradoxically, make vegetarianism a sin (a waste of food) rather than a virtue. Cf. also Thesis III. 10. Even the most orthodox deontologist has to: while a deontologist can argue that prescribing a duty to do x is sensible even if it is impossible to do x, no deontologist has a problem with prescribing a duty that can be performed. 11. This should not be read as censure. As should by now be evident, philosophising under ceteris paribus conditions is a necessary form of creative cognitive dissonance; without this kind of premeditated amnesia, little focus would ever be possible – not in ethics or philosophy in general and not in any of the sciences (cf. Vallentyne 2005). 12. A referee remarked that 'healthy ecosystems are an essential precondition for the flourishing of individuals', which would be a 'powerful argument against replacing nature by justice'. Ignoring the conceptual problems posed by the term 'healthy', I would counter that this only provides an argument for prudence in adapting ecosystems, not an objection on grounds of principle (cf. also note 4), and that the desirability of the health of an ecosystem is determined here by its contribution to the flourishing of individuals – if a (partly or totally) different ecosystem were (practically feasible and) more accommodating, it would have to be considered preferable, and on a human-inclusive conception of an ecosystem it might even count as 'more healthy'. 13. I have ignored the possibility that Nussbaum's argument could be extended to capabilities and justice for plants (carnivorous or other). 14. This is, of course, not the only possible way to deal with the contradictions between Nussbaum and ecologism. Schlosberg (2008) and Cripps (2010) consider whether Nussbaum should adopt a less individualistic conception of flourishing; Hailwood (2009) suggests that Nussbaum's conception of nature does not sufficiently appreciate the wilderness aspect of nature. Without denying the validity of attempts to make Nussbaum move in the direction of ecologism, what I suggest here is that ecologism could also move towards Nussbaum.