斯塔克伯格竞赛
偏移量(计算机科学)
碳补偿
环境经济学
证书
激励
计算机科学
排放交易
产业组织
业务
微观经济学
温室气体
经济
生态学
生物
程序设计语言
算法
作者
Hui Hou,Xiangdi Ge,Yulin Yan,Yanchao Lu,Zhang Ji,Zhao Yang Dong
出处
期刊:Energy
[Elsevier BV]
日期:2024-03-09
卷期号:294: 130617-130617
被引量:13
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.energy.2024.130617
摘要
The low-carbon economic operation of integrated energy systems (IES) cannot be separated from the carbon trading and green certificate trading market. Therefore, a low-carbon market mechanism and optimization method for IES is proposed. First, we establish a “green-carbon” offset mechanism to realize the conversion from tradable green certificate (TGC) to carbon quotas to offset system's carbon emissions. Second, considering the impact of market incentives and users' consumption behavior on IES, an energy management method of IES is put forward based on Stackelberg game. IES operators as leaders decide energy prices and trading strategies of carbon, TGC and multi-energy. Energy users as followers participate in the integrated demand response based on energy price. The game is solved by an improved adaptive catastrophic genetic algorithm and CPLEX solver. Finally, we take an industrial park in China as an example to analyze. The results show that the proposed method can significantly reduce the system's carbon emissions while improving the benefits for both IES and consumers.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI