改装
晋升(国际象棋)
业务
激励
政府(语言学)
环境经济学
透视图(图形)
占用率
点(几何)
产业组织
营销
公共经济学
经济
微观经济学
计算机科学
建筑工程
语言学
哲学
几何学
数学
结构工程
人工智能
政治
政治学
法学
工程类
作者
Guo Liu,Xiaohu Li,Xin Hu,Kunhui Ye
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jobe.2023.108293
摘要
Energy-efficient retrofitting (EER) of existing residential buildings holds significant potential for addressing environment and energy related issues. However, this potential remains largely untapped due to low EER rates and unsatisfactory EER effects. The widespread EER promotion and its benefits for sustainable development are hindered by the inactive participating of homeowners and (or) contractors and the lack of government supervision. To address these challenges, this study develops a tripartite game model for the government, the contractor, and the homeowner by concentrating on their expected EER effects. The strategy interactions among these stakeholders and their dynamic evolution were explored, and the stable strategy states and their formation conditions were identified. It was found that (1) positive engagement of the tripartite stakeholders in housing EER can be a stable strategy in reality; (2) EER effects plays a significant impact on the strategy stability; (3) governments' incentives are necessary in approaching the ideal EER strategy equilibrium point, with a more pronounced influence on contractors compared to homeowners. In line with the findings, policy implications were provided to enhance the adoption of housing EER. This study contributes to a better understanding of large-scale EER promotion and provides a solid foundation for the development of a sustainable EER market involving multiple stakeholders.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI