Exclusion or Subsidization? A Competitive Analysis of Quality Regulation Strategy for Two-Sided Platforms

双头垄断 质量(理念) 网络效应 业务 竞赛(生物学) 模式(计算机接口) 补贴 双边市场 产业组织 计算机科学 微观经济学 经济 市场经济 哲学 认识论 生态学 古诺竞争 生物 操作系统
作者
Gaoyan Lyu,Lin Tian,Wei Wang
出处
期刊:Production and Operations Management [Wiley]
被引量:5
标识
DOI:10.1177/10591478231224915
摘要

With two-sided platforms becoming an increasingly ubiquitous business model, quality is a vital factor for the success of high-technology platforms that face fierce competition. To maintain competency, high-technology platforms commonly use two quality regulation strategies: the exclusion strategy (E strategy), in which the platform denies access to low-quality complementors, and the subsidization strategy (S strategy), in which the platform provides a fixed subsidy to high-quality complementors. This paper investigates the optimal quality regulation strategy for platforms in a duopoly setting. We examine and compare three scenarios: (i) both platforms adopt the exclusion strategy, i.e. mode EE, (ii) both platforms adopt the subsidization strategy, i.e. mode SS, and (ii) one platform adopts the subsidization strategy while the other adopts the exclusion strategy, i.e. mode SE. First, we find that although the developer network size is larger and the platforms charge developers higher access fees under SS, the average quality and the consumer access fees are lower under SS than under EE, leading to lower profits for platforms. Second, under SE, in comparison with the platform that adopts the exclusion strategy, the platform that uses the subsidization strategy achieves lower average quality and larger network sizes on both sides but may set higher or lower access fees on both sides. Moreover, the platform under the subsidization strategy profits more (less) when the operation cost on the developer side is high (low). Third, asymmetric mode SE does not necessarily induce moderate outcomes for market participants compared to modes EE and SS. We also examine the equilibrium mode by considering platforms’ optimal strategies for quality regulation. Our analyses reveal that as the operation cost on the developer side increases, the equilibrium mode evolves from EE to SE/ES and then to SS. These results and insights are robust to several alternative assumptions.
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
更新
PDF的下载单位、IP信息已删除 (2025-6-4)

科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
刚刚
天才罗发布了新的文献求助10
1秒前
1秒前
1秒前
打打应助淋漓尽致采纳,获得10
1秒前
珂尔维特发布了新的文献求助10
3秒前
3秒前
4秒前
eeush完成签到,获得积分10
4秒前
张丹兰完成签到,获得积分10
4秒前
风清扬应助Mingda采纳,获得10
4秒前
5秒前
5秒前
5秒前
grzzz完成签到,获得积分10
6秒前
鹿立轩发布了新的文献求助10
6秒前
6秒前
7秒前
7秒前
liuziop发布了新的文献求助10
7秒前
lily发布了新的文献求助10
7秒前
lili完成签到,获得积分10
7秒前
义气的乐曲完成签到,获得积分20
7秒前
Jamesliu发布了新的文献求助10
8秒前
传奇3应助你终硕采纳,获得10
8秒前
ee发布了新的文献求助10
8秒前
Jiayi发布了新的文献求助10
9秒前
Vanessa发布了新的文献求助10
9秒前
顺心夜南发布了新的文献求助10
10秒前
自信的小ping子完成签到,获得积分10
10秒前
大模型应助to高坚果采纳,获得10
10秒前
iiing发布了新的文献求助10
10秒前
于凡完成签到,获得积分10
10秒前
汉堡包应助高高烨磊采纳,获得10
10秒前
打打应助嘉汐采纳,获得10
11秒前
嗯哼完成签到,获得积分20
12秒前
genos发布了新的文献求助10
12秒前
小坤同学完成签到,获得积分10
13秒前
Meng发布了新的文献求助10
13秒前
充电宝应助LeeWX采纳,获得10
13秒前
高分求助中
(应助此贴封号)【重要!!请各用户(尤其是新用户)详细阅读】【科研通的精品贴汇总】 10000
Manipulating the Mouse Embryo: A Laboratory Manual, Fourth Edition 1000
Comparison of spinal anesthesia and general anesthesia in total hip and total knee arthroplasty: a meta-analysis and systematic review 500
INQUIRY-BASED PEDAGOGY TO SUPPORT STEM LEARNING AND 21ST CENTURY SKILLS: PREPARING NEW TEACHERS TO IMPLEMENT PROJECT AND PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING 500
Founding Fathers The Shaping of America 500
Distinct Aggregation Behaviors and Rheological Responses of Two Terminally Functionalized Polyisoprenes with Different Quadruple Hydrogen Bonding Motifs 460
Writing to the Rhythm of Labor Cultural Politics of the Chinese Revolution, 1942–1976 300
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 材料科学 医学 生物 工程类 有机化学 生物化学 物理 纳米技术 计算机科学 内科学 化学工程 复合材料 物理化学 基因 催化作用 遗传学 冶金 电极 光电子学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 4577394
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 3996655
关于积分的说明 12373185
捐赠科研通 3670647
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 2022943
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 1057104
科研通“疑难数据库(出版商)”最低求助积分说明 944067