斯塔克伯格竞赛
海岸
补贴
供应链
利润(经济学)
业务
垄断
政府(语言学)
产业组织
端口(电路理论)
财务
环境经济学
商业
微观经济学
经济
工程类
市场经济
营销
渔业
哲学
电气工程
生物
语言学
作者
Chuanxu Wang,Yan Jiao,Jiayi Peng
标识
DOI:10.1080/03088839.2023.2174609
摘要
With the deep integration of shipping companies and the stable operation of the three alliances (2 M, THE, Ocean), the previous situation of port monopoly has changed. In view of this situation, this paper tries to study the influence of government subsidies on the choice of shore power or lower sulfur fuel oil strategy of shipping company and the entire maritime supply chain under different power structures (Port Stackelberg (PS), Nash Game (N), Shipping company Stackelberg (CS)). Results show that when carbon price is very low or very high, the governmental subsidy will not affect the shipping company's choice of shore power or lower sulfur fuel oil, but when carbon price is moderate, government subsidy will encourage shipping company to adopt shore power (SP). For the shipping company, using LSFO when the carbon price is low or adopting SP when the carbon price is high can bring the highest profit. For the government, if the government cares more about the supply chain's profit, then the government should try to promote the power structure of PS or CS, and if the government pays more attention to social welfare, the power structure of N should be promoted.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI