国家所有制
新兴市场
效率低下
背景(考古学)
产业组织
业务
制度逻辑
中国
国家(计算机科学)
代理(哲学)
竞赛(生物学)
面板数据
市场经济
经济
经济体制
财务
生物
认识论
计算机科学
哲学
社会学
计量经济学
古生物学
人类学
法学
生态学
政治学
算法
作者
Kevin Zheng Zhou,Gerald Yong Gao,Hongxin Zhao
标识
DOI:10.1177/0001839216674457
摘要
Using two longitudinal panel datasets of Chinese manufacturing firms, we assess whether state ownership benefits or impedes firms’ innovation. We show that state ownership in an emerging economy enables a firm to obtain crucial R&D resources but makes the firm less efficient in using those resources to generate innovation, and we find that a minority state ownership is an optimal structure for innovation development in this context. Moreover, the inefficiency of state ownership in transforming R&D input into innovation output decreases when industrial competition is high, as well as for start-up firms. Our findings integrate the efficiency logic (agency theory), which views state ownership as detrimental to innovation, and institutional logic, which notes that governments in emerging economies have critical influences on regulatory policies and control over scarce resources. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on state ownership and firm innovation in emerging economies.
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